

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

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Executive Secretary

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Date

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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ATTACHMENT

January 20, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
UNITED NATIONS
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY

Subject: National Security Council Meeting -- Libya

The President will chair a meeting of the National Security Council in the Cabinet Room of the White House on Thursday, January 21, 1982 from 3:30 - 5:00 p.m.

Papers for the second agenda item -- Libya -- are attached.

Principals only should attend the meeting.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



William P. Clark

Attachments

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A G E N D A

NSC INFORMATION MEETING ON LIBYA

January 21, 1982, 3:30-5:00 p.m.

The Cabinet Room

- I. The effect of the U.S. demarche sent to Libya. (Tab B)
- II. The status of the voluntary withdrawal of American citizens from Libya, invalidation of U.S. passports for travel to Libya, and prohibition of travel to or presence in Libya by U.S. nationals. (Tabs B & C)
- III. Preparation for an import ban on Libyan oil to the U.S. and an export ban on American products to Libya (Tabs D & E)
- IV. Planning for military measures in response to provocative Libyan moves against the U.S. (Tab F)
- V. Planning for Soviet responses to U.S. military actions against Libya. (Tab G)
- VI. Libya Task Force study on changes since NSDD 16 of December 10, 1981. (Tab H)
- VII. Preparation for February NSC decision making meeting on Libya.

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SECRET/SENSITIVESTATUS REPORT ON LIBYAI. Status of Decisions

On December 8, the President directed that three steps be taken immediately to reduce the threat that Libya poses to U.S. security. These steps are described in National Security Decision Directive Number 16. The results are:

1. Warning to Libya: The Belgian Ambassador was received on December 10 by a working-level Foreign Secretariat official in Tripoli who said that he had been delegated by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who had consulted "at the highest level," to receive President Reagan's message. The Libyan official rejected our note and gave the Belgian a message in English for transmittal to us. The essence of the Libyan message is that Tripoli rejects our accusations, challenges us to prove them, and suggests that there may be "elements working in the background" to further poison U.S.-Libyan relations. In sum, this was a polite but complete rejection of the accusation, and we still are unable to assess whether it had any impact on Qadhafi. The CIA believes that our demarche and our other actions have had an intimidating effect that has caused Qadhafi to suspend his activities, at least against U.S. personnel.

2. Request for Withdrawal: The President's request that U.S. corporations facilitate the rapid withdrawal of their American employees was transmitted to the Chief Executive Officers of those companies on December 10. Most of the 35 firms involved have moved rapidly to remove their U.S. workers and dependents. As of January 15, fifteen firms had withdrawn all of their U.S. personnel from Libya. The remaining 20 companies have reduced significantly, and most expect to have their American employees out by the end of January. At present, about 400 U.S. employees/dependents remain of the approximately 1200 in Libya on December 10. By February 1 we expect the number to drop to fewer than 100.

We have less information about the other estimated 300 U.S. citizens in Libya on December 10. This group, which consists primarily of U.S. citizen spouses of Libyans and Americans working directly for the Libyan Government (e.g., technicians, professors), has declined, but we do not know by how much. A small number of workers (perhaps two dozen) who refuse to leave are being terminated by their U.S. employers, and will work for the Libyan National Oil Company or other Libyan enterprises.

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The Libyan Government is facilitating the departure of those Americans who have decided to leave Libya.

3. Invalidation of Travel: Effective December 11, the Department invalidated U.S. passports for travel to, through, or in Libya. Most Americans who intended to travel to Libya are respecting this order, despite Libyan orders to immigration officials not to stamp U.S. passports. There have been press reports that a few U.S. companies are directing their employees to enter Libya without passports: the companies have denied this. Some U.S. individuals are entering Libya without using their passports.

A special section has been designated within the Passport Office to process passport validation requests to travel to Libya. As of January 8, three journalists and five humanitarian applicants (spouses of Libyans) had had their applications approved. Forty-four "national interest" applications had been granted, primarily for individuals designated by their companies to coordinate the withdrawal effort.

II. Pertinent Developments Since December 10 (Preliminary)

(a) U.S.-Libyan Relations: The Libyan Government's December 10 response to the President's warning, which we believe to have been cleared with Qadhafi, claimed that Libya desires to improve relations with us. We have heard this through numerous other intermediaries including German Foreign Minister Genscher. In addition, Qadhafi personally sent an intelligence envoy in mid-December to convey to us that the Libyan leader was "upset and shocked" over our withdrawal of U.S. citizens from Libya and that Qadhafi would be willing to make "any accommodation necessary" to better ties with us. The same envoy claimed that, as a gesture, Qadhafi has cancelled all terrorist and assassination operations and has begun to dismantle terrorist training camps--an admission that Qadhafi's denials of their existence were meaningless.

Qadhafi at present is in a relatively weak position internally. A recent coup attempt by the trusted military and consumer discontent over food shortages and cutbacks in imports due to cash flow problems may have led him to take the steps he claims to have taken to defuse tensions with the U.S. We do not have good evidence of continued activities against U.S. officials. On the other hand, however, we are receiving reports that Libyans terrorist and subversive activities continue. We have not been able to confirm any terrorist camp dismantling. (The CIA notes that we would not expect to do so by technical means. Confirmation would almost certainly require a human

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source.) The consensus here is that Qadhafi, however disconcerted he may be about our steps, is not prepared to abandon his goals, though he may be willing in the face of firm U.S. resolve to modify some of his extreme methods.

(b) U.S.-Soviet Relations: Although Libya is an important Soviet friend, Moscow is cautious by nature. Our response to the Soviet hand in the Polish crisis, an area which is of crucial security significance to Moscow, might make the Soviets more wary of becoming involved directly in U.S.-Libyan disagreements. Their overt action since December 10 has been limited to propaganda attacks on U.S. "pressure" against Libya.

(c) Other Developments: A very important development since December 10 was the reestablishment of Saudi-Libyan diplomatic relations. This step, taken principally in response to the Israeli occupation of the Golan, was intended to begin the process of restoring shattered Arab unity. Qadhafi has since publicly criticized the Saudis on two occasions.

The French normalized relations with Libya on the day after we asked U.S. citizens to withdraw. The French, who believe that increased ties with Qadhafi will prevent closer Libyan ties to the Soviets, explained that the Libyans had fulfilled their conditions for normalization (withdrawal from Chad and commitment to rebuild the French Embassy in Tripoli). It is likely that the timing of the French move also was an effort to keep a communication channel open to Qadhafi.

We have no evidence that Libyan forces are returning surreptitiously to Chad. (They are, however, still in the disputed Aouzu strip.) The OAU Peacekeeping Force is in place; there were no PKF clashes with the withdrawing Libyans.

Our imposition of economic sanctions against the Soviet Union in response to the Polish crisis and our efforts to obtain the cooperation of our European allies in this regard are creating anxieties among our allies and increasing their sensitivity to our use of economic sanctions to achieve political ends.

The soft international oil market is now expected to continue at least through the summer barring unforeseen political disruptions. In December, Libya temporarily increased oil production by reducing prices to within the current world range, relieving somewhat the cash flow problems the Tripoli authorities have had for the past few months.

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III. Interagency Preparation for Next Steps

As mandated by NSDD 16, a Task Force on Libya was established under the co-chairmanship of the State Department and the White House. This task force has been monitoring the progress of withdrawal of Americans from Libya and the planning for possible further economic measures (embargo of imports of Libyan oil, embargo of exports to Libya) and military contingency planning described in items 4 and 5 of NSDD 16. In addition, the task force has reviewed the paper requested in item 8 of NSDD 16: A Study of Soviet Military Responses to U.S. Military Action Against Libya. This paper includes a section describing U.S. counter-moves designed to deter Soviet military involvement in response to U.S. action.

The Libya Task Force is currently undertaking an interagency review of the analysis and recommendations that were the basis for NSDD 16. The purpose of this review is to revalidate the anticipated political and economic effects of further economic measures (item 4a: an embargo of Libyan oil and item 4b: an embargo of exports to Libya) and the efficacy and political effects of contingency military plans and efforts to deter Soviet involvement described in NSDD 16 items 5, 6 and 8.

In addition to the revalidation aspect of this exercise, the interagency review has been designed so as to be able to factor in relevant changes in the international environment and in the Libyan internal situation that have occurred since the December 8 decisions. Events in Poland and the reports that Qadhafi is encountering increased internal pressure, including coup attempts against him, are the most important factors here. Changes in the regional environment, in the economic and oil outlook, and in Congressional and public opinion are also being assessed for their potential relevance to the economic and military measures being reviewed.

As requested in the memorandum accompanying NSDD 16, the Libya Task Force review is also preparing additional options for the President with regard to Libya. In tandem with this part of the exercise, and taking account of any pertinent changes in the international environment and in Libyan internal circumstances and Qadhafi's perception of threat, the interagency review is also reassessing U.S. objectives toward Libya.

The objectives as stated in the SIG and NSC papers upon which the President's decisions on Libya were taken were:

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
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"to end Libyan support for international terrorism, to inhibit Libya from undermining friendly governments in Africa and the Middle East, and to influence Libya to stop assassination efforts against U.S. officials and Libyan nationals in third countries." These objectives are being revised to make them detailed enough so they could be used in a specific ultimatum to Qadhafi describing the kind of Libyan behavior that must cease. In addition, the scope of the objectives is being reassessed. The question here is to consider expansion of our objectives to include measures to affect the continuity of the regime itself.

The task force is also working on a paper concerning Middle East Regional Reaction to U.S. military action. It will be similar in scope to the Study of Soviet Military Responses to U.S. Military Action against Libya.

These papers will provide the basis for an NSC Decision Paper for a meeting tentatively scheduled for February 4, 1982. This is a point in time very close to the mid-February target date for the completion of the voluntary withdrawal of Americans from Libya. Consequently, the President will be well-positioned to take decisions on next steps toward Libya in the full knowledge that all Americans will have left Libya except a small number who are remaining at their own choice and in conscious violation of U.S. policy. One decision for the February 4 meeting will be whether to take additional measures to force the departure of these remaining American citizens.

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Confidential**TRAVEL-RELATED RESTRICTIONS****WITH RESPECT TO**

Executive Order _____, 1981

Pursuant to the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and Statutes of the United States, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, find that the policies and actions of the Government of _____ constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.

1-101. I hereby prohibit the following transactions:

(a) Effective immediately, any transactions by any citizen or permanent resident of the United States relating to travel to _____ after the date of this Order by any citizen or permanent resident alien of the United States.

(b) Effective fourteen days from the date of this Order, the payment by or on behalf of any citizen or permanent resident of the United States who is within _____ of any expenses for transactions within _____.

1-102. The prohibitions in Section 1-101 above shall not

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apply to a person who is also a citizen of _____, or to a person whose passport has been specially validated by the State Department for travel to _____.

1-103. The Secretary of the Treasury is delegated, and authorized to exercise, all functions vested in the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to carry out the purposes of this Order. The Secretary may redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the Federal government.

1-104. The Secretary of State is delegated, and authorized to exercise in furtherance of the purposes of this Order, the powers vested in the President by Section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1185), with respect to:

(a) The restrictions of the use of United States passports for travel to, in or through _____; and

(b) The regulation of departures from and entry into the United States in connection with travel to _____ by citizens and permanent residents of the United States.

1-105. Except as otherwise indicated herein, this Order is effective immediately. In accordance with section 201 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1621) and section 204 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703), it shall immediately be transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register.

The White House

_____, 1981

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PROHIBITING OIL IMPORTS

FROM _____ *

Executive Order _____, 1981

Pursuant to the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including the International Emergency Economic Powers (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, find that the policies and actions of the Government of _____ constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.

1-101. I hereby prohibit the following, effective immediately, notwithstanding any contracts entered into or licenses granted before the date of this Order:

(a) The direct or indirect import into the customs territory of the United States of crude oil produced in _____ (except crude oil or oil products loaded aboard maritime vessels prior to _____) or unfinished oil or finished products refined in possessions or free trade zones of the United States from such crude oil.

(b) The engaging by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in any transaction which evades or avoids,

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or has the purpose or effect of evading or avoiding, any of the prohibitions set forth in this section.

1-102. The Secretary of the Treasury is delegated, and authorized to exercise, all functions vested in the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to carry out the purposes of this Order. The Secretary may redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the Federal government.

1-103. This Order is effective immediately. In accordance with Section 201 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1621) and Section 204 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703), it shall immediately be transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register.

The White House

_____, 1981

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- * This draft order would not prohibit U.S. firms from producing or buying and selling Libyan oil outside the United States nor would it prohibit the import of oil products produced from Libyan crude.

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PROHIBITING TRADE AND RELATED
TRANSACTIONS WITH _____ *
Executive Order _____, 1981

Pursuant to the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including the International Emergency Economic Powers (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, find that the policies and actions of the Government of _____ constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.

1-101. I hereby prohibit the following, effective immediately, notwithstanding any contracts entered into or licenses granted before the date of this Order:

(a) The direct or indirect import into the customs territory of the United States of crude oil produced in _____ (except crude oil or oil products loaded aboard maritime vessels prior to _____) or unfinished oil or finished products refined in possessions or free trade zones of the United States from such crude oil.

(b) The sale, supply, or other transfer, by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of any items, commodities, or products, except food, medicine and supplies

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intended strictly for medical purposes, and donations of clothing intended to be used to relieve human suffering, from the United States, or from any foreign country, whether or not originating in the United States, either to or destined for _____, a governmental entity in _____, any other person or body in _____, or any other person or body for the purposes of any enterprise carried on in _____.

(c) The shipment by vessel, aircraft, railway or other land transport of United States registration or owned by or under charter to any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or the carriage (whether or not in bond) by land transport facilities across the United States of any of the items, commodities and products covered by paragraph (b) of this section which are consigned to or destined for _____, a _____ governmental entity, or any person or body in _____, or to any enterprise carried on in _____.

(d) The engaging by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in any service contract in support of any project in _____, except any such contract entered into prior to the date of this Order or concerned with medical care.

(e) The engaging by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in any transaction which evades or avoids, or has the purpose or effect of evading or avoiding, any of the prohibitions set forth in this section.

1-102. The prohibitions in section 1-101(b)-(e) above shall not apply to transactions by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States which is a non-banking

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association, corporation, or other organization organized and doing business under the laws of any foreign country.

1-103. The Secretary of the Treasury is delegated, and authorized to exercise, all functions vested in the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to carry out the purposes of this Order. The Secretary may redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the Federal government.

1-104. This Order is effective immediately. In accordance with Section 201 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1621) and Section 204 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703), it shall immediately be transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register.

The White House

_____, 1981

* Exempt from the trade embargo provided for under this draft order are:

- Service contracts in existence at the time the order is signed (Section 1-101(d)).
- Trade by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations (Section 1-102).

This draft order would not prohibit U.S. firms from producing or buying and selling Libyan oil outside the United States nor would it prohibit the import of oil products produced from Libyan crude.

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Cl. by Director, J-3
Rvw. on 12/31/2001

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ANNEX A

December 31, 1981

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CLASSIFIED BY DIRECTOR, J-3
REVIEW ON 31 DECEMBER 2001
EXTENDED BY DIRECTOR, J-3
REASON: 5200.1R, PARA 2-301c56

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
Annex A

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Annex A




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Annex A


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Annex A



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Annex B

CLASSIFIED BY DIRECTOR, J-3
REVIEW ON 31 DECEMBER 2001
EXTENDED BY DIRECTOR, J-3
REASON: 5200.1R, PARA 301c667

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The Soviet Role in a US-Libyan Confrontation

The Soviet Union is extremely unlikely to use its military forces in the event of a US-Libyan military confrontation. The Soviet response to any U.S. military action against Libya would be shaped by five factors:

- 1) The cause for and type of US action. If Libya claimed credit for assassinating a high US official, for example, the Soviets would probably publicly distance themselves from Libya. They would criticise the US response as an over-reaction, attempt to stir up anti-US sentiment in the region, and try to convince Colonel Qadhafi that greater Soviet use of his facilities would deter further US actions.
- 2) Soviet perception of the seriousness of U.S. resolve and ultimate goal. If the Soviets judge that the US is "bent on revenge" and will not be deterred, they are likely to confine their actions to the diplomatic and propaganda fields. If they believe that U.S. military action is a prelude to toppling Colonel Qadhafi, they would face a difficult choice. Nonetheless, the Soviets are likely under those circumstances to be deterred themselves.
- 3) The timing of the US response. If the US acts quickly, there is minimal risk of the Soviets positioning their forces to block an American move. If the US gradually unfolds its response by selecting an option which requires a US force build-up or long-term stationing without actual combat use, the chances of the Soviets deploying their forces increase.
- 4) Soviet perception of the overall balance of forces and particularly the military balance in and around Libya. Although Soviet naval strength in the Mediterranean has grown dramatically in recent years, the US could inflict severe military damage on the vulnerable Soviet supply line to the Libyan area. It is probably not an area in which the Soviets would choose to fight the U.S.
- 5) Poland and Afghanistan. While the Soviets have sufficient forces to deal with crises in those locations and Libya simultaneously, they would prefer not to run the risk of escalation that would come from having multiple US-Soviet confrontations. If they had already planned to use additional forces in Poland or Afghanistan, they might adjust their schedule to take advantage of the diversion of worldwide attention that a US-Libyan confrontation would create.

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DRV. CL. BY DIRECTOR, J-3

Rvw. on 12/31/2001

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January 18, 1982

TERMS OF REFERENCE
LIBYA: NEXT STEPS

Purpose: Preparation of a paper for the President. The paper will take NSDD 16, Economic and Security Decisions for Libya, as its point of departure. The paper will factor in and evaluate changes that have taken place since NSDD 16 was issued on December 10, 1981.

A. Specifically, the paper will:

1. describe the implementation and international effects of NSDD 16 items 1, 2, and 3 (demarche to Qadhafi; voluntary withdrawal of Americans; and invalidation of passports for travel in Libya);
2. review the anticipated political and economic effects of items 4a (embargo of imports of Libyan oil to the U.S.) and 4b (embargo of U.S. exports to Libya);
3. review the efficacy and political effects of contingency military plans and efforts to deter Soviet involvement described in items 5, 6, and 8; and
4. recommend additional political/psychological, economic, and military options, as necessary.

B. In the course of the review outlined above, special attention will be given to the following sources of a potentially changed environment for the next action steps under consideration:

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1. changes in Libyan behavior and in U.S.-Libyan relations, including an updated psychological profile of Qadhafi and a description of political conditions within Libya (coup attempts against Qadhafi, assassination attempts against him, other sources and indicators of domestic unrest);
2. changes in the international environment, particularly events in Poland and their effect on the use of economic sanctions, military force, U.S. relations with allies, and the likelihood of Soviet intervention on behalf of Libya (extension of Soviet paper to include Poland);
3. changes in the regional environment, such as developments regarding the Golan Heights and Southern Lebanon as well as possibility of a Tunisian-Libyan confrontation following the February International Court of Justice decision on oil deposits contested between them, and, as appropriate, changes in Libyan-Egyptian relations and changes in Libyan relations with Saudi Arabia and other key Arab and Islamic states;
4. changes in the economic environment, specifically in the near-to-mid-term oil market; and
5. changes in Congressional and public opinion, if any.

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C. Based on the updated analysis of the action steps in NSDD 16 (sections A and B above), the paper for the President will include a reevaluation and possible amplification of U.S. objectives regarding Libya. These objectives, as stated in the SIG and NSC papers from which the President's decisions derived were:

to end Libyan support for international terrorism,
to inhibit Libya from undermining friendly governments in Africa and the Middle East, and to influence Libya to stop assassination efforts against U.S. officials and Libyan nationals in third countries.

D. The paper for the President shall take into account regional risks of different types of U.S. military actions and will address such questions as:

- 1) the role of radical Arab states in advocating Arab rejection of US peace efforts, Arab sanctions against the US, and increased Arab reliance on USSR. Special attention should be devoted to the regional roles of Libya and Syria;
- 2) the private and public role of moderate Arab states; impact on Saudi willingness to pursue the Fahd plan or any peace process based on a compromise settlement; Arab states' willingness to cooperate with US in security sphere; impact on Egypt's willingness to continue the Camp David peace process.

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3) political reaction of Soviets, especially in terms of their opposition to Camp David, desire for an expanded Soviet presence, and objective of a reduced US presence in the area.

The paper also shall take into account regional benefits of different types of US military action against Libya and will address such questions as:

- 1) the deterrent effect of US military action on Libya and Syria
- 2) the effect of US military action on the private and public role of moderate Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt.
- 3) the deterrent effect of US military action on the Soviets.

Interagency recommendations concerning the timing of implementation of next steps will be provided.

Papers (2-3 pages maximum)

1. Implementation and effects of steps 1-3 toward Libya under NSDD 16 (by c.o.b. January 20 for January 21 NSC meeting)
State-NEA lead, coordinate with State-S/P and CIA
 - 2.* Current Libyan behavior: What is effect of U.S. actions on Libyan support for international terrorism, destabilization of friendly regimes, general interference in affairs of other nations, assassination efforts against U.S. officials and Libyan nationals in third countries and Libyan relations with Soviets and Eastern bloc? Update in Terms of U.S. objectives where relevant.
CIA lead, coordinate with State-NEA, State-S/P, State-PM, and OSD
 - 3.** Review Economic measures under NSDD 16.
State-EB lead, coordinate with State-S/P, Treasury, and Commerce
 - 4.** Review Military plans for options.
OSD lead, coordinate with JCS, State-PM, and State-S/P
 - 5.** Possible Additional Political, Economic, and Military Options.
State-PM lead, coordinate with State-NEA, State-S/P, OSD, CIA, and JCS
-
- 7*. Current Libyan Internal Situation and Potential Impact of U.S. Actions.
CIA lead, coordinate with State-NEA, State-S/P, and State-INR

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8.* Revelant Changes in International Environment.

State-S/P lead, coordinate with State-EUR, State-NEA, and State-PM, CIA

9.* Relevant Changes in Relations with Regional States.

State-NEA lead, coordinate with CIA, State-S/P, and State-PM

10.* Relevant Changes Projected for Oil Market

State-EB lead, coordinate with CIA, Commerce, and State-S/P

11.* Relevant Changes in Congressional and Public Opinion.

State-NEA lead, coordinate with State-S/P

12.* Reevaluation of Objectives

State-S/P lead, coordinate with OSD, JCS, State-NEA, and State-PM

13.** Regional Risks and Benefits of U.S. Military actions against Libya.

CIA lead, coordinate with State-NEA, State-S/P, State-PM, OSD, and JCS

14.** Strategy for Timing of Next Steps.

State-S/P lead, coordinate with State-NEA, State-PM, and OSD

* Draft due c.o.b. January 22, 1982

** Draft due c.o.b. January 27, 1982.

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